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Laura Moreno and Jorge Pe´rez∗
Abstract
In this paper we use an OLG model where agents are heterogeneous
within each generation, differing in their impatience rate. We show
that the effects of a capital-using technological change are not sym-
metric between agents and can cause a reduction in consumption.
The asymmetry in impatience rates has consequences on the bene-
fits derived from technological change for further generations. Lower
impatience rates lead to higher capital levels, and to higher levels
of consumption provided that the economy has enough capital per
capita.
Keywords: Biased Technological Change, Social Welfare, Overlapping
Generations
Resumen
En este art´ıculo utilizamos un modelo de generaciones traslapadas con
heterogeneidad en la tasa de impaciencia para mostrar que los efectos
de un cambio tecnolo´gico aumentador de capital no son sime´tricos
en los agentes y pueden conllevar una reduccio´n en el consumo. La
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asimetr´ıa en la tasa de impaciencia de los agentes en un per´ıodo,
tiene consecuencias sobre los beneficios del cambio tecnolo´gico para las
generaciones futuras. Menores tasas de impaciencia llevan a mayores
niveles de capital y de consumo, si se entiende que la economı´a tiene
el suficiente nivel de capital per ca´pita.
Palabras clave: cambio tecnolo´gico, bienestar social, superposicio´n de
generaciones.
(JEL CODE: O33, O40, I31)
1 Introduction
Recently, biased innovation models have gained acceptance.1 This
literature makes extensive use of homogeneous agents models. How-
ever, the effects of this type of innovations on different individuals can
vary substantially. Indeed, in an overlapping generations framework
this type of technological change may reduce the income of young peo-
ple (see Bertola (1996); Zuleta (1998) and Zuleta & Alberico (2007)).
These OLG models, however, only explore the consequence of one
source of heterogeneity. On top of that, Bertola (1993) and Bertola
(1996) show that change in factor shares can have different effects
on different types of agents and non monotonous effects on welfare.
We contribute to the literature including heterogenous preferences, in
particular, heterogeneous discount factors.
We use a two period overlapping generations model where agents
are heterogeneous within each generation, differing on their impa-
tience (or discount) rate. While the heterogeneity might also be due
to differences in endowments or utility functions, for the sake of sim-
plicity, we focus only on one source of heterogeneity. Biased innova-
tions are modeled just as an exogenous rise in the share of capital in
the production function, so innovations are of the factor-saving type.
As far as we know, our model is the first one involving factor saving
innovations and heterogeneous agents within each generation.
In our model, although impatience rates do not change the qual-
itative effects of technological changes on welfare, they play a role
1 Zeira (1998), Acemoglu (2002), Boldrin and Levive (2002), Peretto & Seater
(2007) and Zuleta (2008b), among others, provide models of this type.
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in determining the magnitude of consumption and welfare changes,
which are asymmetric between agents. The heterogeneity in discount
rates might also determine the rate growth of capital, thus determin-
ing the effect of technological change for successive generations.
Kennedy (1964 and 1973) introduce the models of biased innova-
tions, arguing that firms change their production technology in order
to reduce their costs. Therefore, factor saving innovations will be
preferred if capital is more abundant and has a smaller price. How-
ever, in these pioneer models, consumers do not play an active role.
Recently, some scholars have revisited this topic using general equilib-
rium framework. Zeira (1998) explains that non neutral technological
change can explain permanent income differences among countries.
Acemoglu (2002) shows how the effect of biased technological change
depends on the elasticity of substitution between inputs and explains
how the effects of innovations change as the abundance and relative
intensity of factors varies. Peretto & Seater (2007) and Zuleta (2008b)
develop endogenous growth models with labor saving (or eliminating)
technological progress and show that the economy might stagnate with
zero growth or grow perpetually as in the AK model. These models
provide a theory of endogenous industrialization.2 All these are con-
tinuous time models, where consumers are homogenous. In contrast,
ours is a discrete time model with heterogeneous agents.
Zuleta (1998) and Zuleta & Alberico (2007) develop an overlapping
generations model with factor saving innovations showing that the ef-
fects of technological change depend on the initial conditions of the
economy and that the relation between income distribution and tech-
nological change may be complex. In these models, however, agents
are homogeneous within generations. Additionally, these authors do
not realize welfare analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 shows
the theoretical model. Section 3 shows numerical results. Section 4
concludes and discusses possible extensions.
2 One standard result in this literature is that factor shares should be positively
correlated to the relative abundance of reproducible factors and, consistently,
to percapita income evels. The empirical evidence seems to support this result
(Caselli & Feyrer (2007) , Zuleta (2008a) and Krueger (1999))
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2 A model with heterogeneity in impatience rates
2.1 Framework
We use an standard two-period overlapping generations model. There
is a continuum of agents in this economy: they’re indexed by i and
distributed over the (0, 1) interval. They’re differentiated by their
impatience rate βi. Each individual’s i utility function is given by:
U i = ln cit + β
i ln cit+1 (1)
Where cit stands for consumption of the ith individual on period t. All
agents have the same non reproducible factor’s initial endowment, and
every agent is able to save, accumulating reproducible factors for the
second period . We assume there is a non reproducible factor L and
a reproducible factor K, so called labor and capital. Labor income is
distributed between consumption and savings (2a) on the first period,
the last of these defining the capital’s stock for each agent in the next
period (2b). Consumption in the second period depends of this stock
(2c) . These relationships are summarized in the following equations:
wt = c
i
t + s
i
t (2a)
sit = K
i
t+1 (2b)
cit+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
i
t (2c)
Where r is the interest rate. There’s a representative firm that
produces an unique consumption good with a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function:
Yt = AK
α
t L
1−α
t (3)
Since all agents have the same amount of non reproducible factor,
and are indexed over (0, 1) , labor supply is fixed and equal to 1, so
we can define k = KL = K.
Given this production function, if factor markets are competitive,
and setting the final good as the numeraire, factor prices are given
by:
wt = (1− α)AKαt (4)
rt = αAK
α−1
t (5)
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Each consumer’s problem is
Max
Cit ,C
i
t+1
lnCit + β
i lnCit+1 s.t wt = c
i
t +
cit+1
1 + rt+1
(6)
Solving this problem, we fin the usual consumption ratio providing
from the canonical overlapping generations model, as in Diamond
(1965):
cit+1
cit
= βi(1 + rt+1) (7)
Consumption and savings for each individual in each period are given
by:
cit =
1
1 + βi
wt =
(1− α)AKαt
1 + βi
(8)
cit+1 =
βi(1 + rt+1)wt
1 + βi
=
βi
1 + βi
(1− α)AKαt (1 + αAKα−1t+1 ) (9)
sit = K
i
t+1 =
βi
1 + βi
(1− α)AKαt (10)
The economy’s total savings are given by:
St = Kt+1 =
∫ 1
0
(1− α)AKαt
(
βi
1 + βi
)
di (11)
and, since we have assumed L = 1, we can rewrite (9) as:
cit+1 =
βi
1 + βi
(1−α)AKαt
{
1 + αA
(
(1− α)AKαt
∫ 1
0
(
βi
1 + βi
)
di
)α−1}
(12)
2.2 Equilibrium and Steady state
An equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of aggregate capital
stock, agent consumption and factor prices
{
Kt,
(
cit
)
i∈[0,1] , rt, wt
}∞
t=0
such the factor price sequence is given by (5) and (4), consumption is
given by (8) and (9) and capital evolves according to (11) . The steady
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state is defined in the usual way: setting Kt = Kt+1, the steady state
levels of capital and consumption are given by
Kss = [A (1− α)C]
1
1−α (13)
ciss =
(1− α)A [A (1− α)C] α1−a
1 + βi
=
[A (1− α)] 11−α C α1−α
1 + βi
(14)
Notice that both expressions tend to cero as α goes to one. This
is not surprising, meaning that in our model, biased technological
change is unable to generate long run economic growth, unlike neutral
technological change. Zuleta (1998) shows that in an overlapping
generations model with bequests, steady state levels of consumption
and savings are greater than cero when α = 1. Also notice that smaller
impatience rates lead to higher steady state consumption levels.
2.3 Effects of exogenous technological change
We now turn to examine the effects of a capital-using exogenous tech-
nological change in this economy. Bertola (1996) shows that, in a
continuous time overlapping generations model, higher labor income
shares might lead to either larger or smaller economic growth, depen-
ding on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and under certain
conditions over the parameters of the model. Our objective is to ana-
lyze not only the effect of income shares on economic growth, but the
effect on each individual’s welfare depending on his discount rate.
Capital-using biased technological change is seen as technologi-
cal change leading to higher relative use of capital in the production
process. In this case, we can see technological change as a rise in α.
As shown in (1) each individuals utility depends on consumption
on each period. Overlapping generations models assume individu-
als choose their consumption and savings levels, cit and s
i
t, based on
their wage wt and the expected interest earnings rt+1 on accumulated
capital. These, in turn, define consumption on the second period
cit+1 = (1 + rt+1) s
i
t. So each individuals’ welfare depends on the im-
pact of technological change over consumption decisions, i.e. changes
in equilibrum levels of ct and ct+1 when α changes. These changes will
depend on two facts: changes in wages and interest rates produced
by the change in α (15) and also, wether technological change is pre-
dicted by agents. If technological change occurs after consumption
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decisions have been taken (an unexpected technological change), the
impact on welfare will be different to the one produced when techno-
logical change occurs before consumption decisions have been taken
(an expected technological change).
cit =
1
1 + βi
wt → ∂ct
∂α
=
1
1 + βi
∂wt
∂α
(15)
cit+1 =
βi(1 + rt+1)wt
1 + βi
→ ∂c
i
t+1
∂α
=
βi
1 + βi
(
∂rt+1
∂α
wt + (1 + rt+1)
∂wt
∂α
)
.
2.3.1 Unexpected Technological Change
Let us assume the change in α happens between periods t and t +
1. The effect of technological change will be seen from period t + 1
onwards. Since the change is not predicted, none of the agents will be
able to change his consumption decisions optimally. Consumption in
the first period remains the same, since the wage wt remains unaltered.
However, second period consumption changes as the interest rate rt+1
changes. The agent’s welfare changes, and only rises if the interest
rate does.
Differentiating (5) evaluated at t+ 1 respect to α yields:
∂rt+1
∂α
= A
{
[(1− α)AKαt C]α−1 + α
∂(Kα−1t+1 )
∂α
}
Using (11), and differentiating (Kt+1)
α−1:
Kα−1t+1 = [(1− α)AKαt C]α−1
∂(Kα−1t+1 )
∂α
= [(1− α)CAKαt ]α−1 [(α− 1) ln(Kt)− ln [(1− α)ACKαt ] + 1]
We obtain:
∂rt+1
∂α
= A[(1−α)CAKαt ]α−1 {1 + α [(α− 1) ln(Kt)− ln [(1− α)ACKαt ] + 1]}
(16)
where C =
∫ 1
0
(
βi
1+βi
)
di.
The last expression is greater than cero if:
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Kt <
e
1
α
+1
(1− α)AC (17)
where the right hand side of this inequality takes positive values when-
ever α ∈ (0, 1) and decreases as α goes to one.
Following these facts, if Kt ∈
(
0, e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC
)
a capital-using inno-
vation produces a rise of second period’s consumption for all agents.
Since consumption in the first period remains constant, as long as
capital is in this threshold, all individuals’ welfare is increase, despite
of their impatience rate. This can be easily seen in the utility function
(the upper line stands for variables that remain fixed):
U i = ln cit(α) + β
i ln
(
cit+1(α)
)
We stress the fact that rises in welfare can happen in both labor
abundant and capital abundant economies. Welfare may be decreased
only if either the stock of capital, or its share α, are high before the
change is made.
Individuals that are born after the second period t + 1 will also
be affected by the change in the accumulable factor’s productivity.
However they will be able to adjust their consumption, so, for them,
the change is an expected one. We analyze it in the next section.
2.3.2 Expected Technological Change
If there is an expected shock, so agents know there will be biased tech-
nological change before they take their consumption decisions, welfare
will change according to changes in consumption choices. However,
in this case the wage wt is also modified, so consumption levels vary in
both periods.
Differentiating(4) evaluated at t respect to α:
∂wt
∂α
= AKαt [(1− α) lnK − 1]
This expression is larger than cero, so the wage rises, if
Kt > e
1
1−α (18)
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where e
1
1−α is a positive constant. So if an economy has a sufficient
stock of capital, biased technological change rises consumption in the
first period. The effect on second period’s consumption depends on
changes in wages and interest rates. Differentiating consumption le-
vels yields:
∂cit
∂α
=
AKαt
1 + βi
[(1− α) lnKt − 1] (19)
∂cit+1
∂α
=
βiA
1 + βi
Kαt {[1 + αA ((1− α)ACKα)α−1]
[Kα{α[(1− α) lnK − 1] + (1− α) ln[(1− α)ACKα]}]} (20)
From these expressions, the effect on consumption levels is positive
if Kt > e
1
1−α .
Summarizing, for economies with a high capital stock
(
Kt > e
1
1−α
)
,
biased technological change can rise welfare levels of all individuals,
independently from their impatience rates or the period they’re born.
Again, this can be easily noticed in the utility function:
U i = ln
(
cit(α)
)
+ βi ln
(
cit+1(α)
)
2.4 Asymmetrical effects
The innovation’s effect differs among individuals because they have
two heterogeneous characteristics: First, they’re not born in the same
period. And, each one of them has a different impatience rate. We
now examine the differences in effects caused by these different char-
acteristics:
The overlapping generations model assumes there is an infinite
set of agents. So if there’s technological change at period t∗ + 1, for
those who are born at period t∗ the shock will be unexpected, while
for those born on period t∗ + 1 onwards the shock will be expected.
If Kt ∈
(
e
1
1−α , e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC
)
and e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC > e
1
1−α , welfare rises for all
individuals born at [t∗,∞) .If it is not the case, so Kt > e
1
1−α but
Kt >
e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC then individuals born from t
∗ + 1 gain welfare,
but agents born on t∗ have a welfare loss.
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Given the logarithmic utility function, the savings rate does not
depend on the interest rate. Biased technological change will rise first
period’s consumption and savings, only if it rises both production and
wages.
Summarizing, joining the effects on income shares and the effects
on the optimal saving and consumption paths, using (17) and (20),
it can be seen that when the economy has enough capital then an
expected technological change rises both capital and labor returns,
making individuals richer. This makes them increase their consump-
tion levels in both periods. For greater discount rates βi, the rise (or
reduction) in consumption and savings will be smaller. An innovation
will have positive effects only if the economy has a relatively abundant
stock of capital in period t∗.
Without further restrictions over the model’s parameters, it is
not possible to describe the effect of technological change on the capi-
tal income share over the next period. Even tough if the amount of
capital the economy has at period 1 is large, then it is more likely that
the capital income share falls in the next period, the relationship bet-
ween capital income shares over the two periods is not a monotonous
one.
To examine asymmetrical effects on the individuals due to hete-
rogeneity in impatience rates, we examine consumption and saving
ratios over individuals. For two individuals i, j, from (10) we have:
cit
cjt
=
1
1 + βi
1
1 + βj
(21)
cit+1
cjt+1
=
Kit+1
Kjt+1
=
βi
1 + βi
βj
1 + βj
(22)
Now, examining the rise in savings ratio due to technological
change,
∂sit
∂a

∂sjt
∂α

,we find the same relationship of (22). Changes in
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consumption and saving levels depend only on capital levels on pe-
riod t∗. However, each one of the agents is affected by the innovation
in a different way. If the economy is relatively capital abundant, so
(17) holds, larger discount rates βi are associated with a smaller rise in
consumption in period t∗ and larger rises in savings and consumption
levels in t∗+1. More impatient individuals, who have a smaller βi,have
smaller rises in savings and second period consumption, although the
rise in first period consumption is larger for them.
So when there is biased technological change, different impatience
rates only have incidence on the magnitude of changes in consumption
for each agent. What determines the sign of this change, is the relative
abundance of capital in the period t∗ when the innovation occurs.
This abundance depends on impatience rates on the previous period
t∗ − 1.
So let us assume that each generation of agents has different im-
patience rates3. Suppose there is an economy with a small amount of
capital, so (17) does not hold. If there’s capital-using technological
change in this economy, it will reduce overall consumption. However,
if
∫ 1
o β
i
t∗−1di were large enough compared to
∫ 1
o β
i
t∗di, then the stock
of capital could be large enough at t∗for (17) to hold. In such case,
capital-using technological change would increase overall consumption
and welfare. From these reasoning, it can be seen that innovation ef-
fects for a generation of consumers depend on the previous generation.
3 A numerical example
In this section we explain the results with a numerical example. We
simulate capital, consumption and welfare’s trajectories for three dif-
ferent kinds of agents. Gross utility is our welfare measure. We il-
lustrate three different economies, each one with different settings
when the innovation occurs. Each economy is characterized by the
parameters and the initial capital level. In each case, we modify the
productivity parameter A in the production function, without modi-
fying the initial capital level. For this example, the biased innovation
happens at the 50th period. The parameters used in simulation are
summarized in table 1.
3 This assumption does not bring dynamic consistence issues, since we’re dealing
with a two period model.
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Simulation Parameters
Initial α 0.4 βi 0.3
Final α 0.5 βj 0.6
K0 4 βh 0.9
Case 1 A 2.5
Case 2 A 5
Case 3 A 8
Table 1. Simulation parameters
• Case 1:
When the innovation occurs, the capital level is lower than critical
level k = e
1
1−α , so the agents’ consumption and welfare levels fall.
Notice that the effect is bigger if the agent has a lower impatience
rate. However, at the moment of biased innovation, the agents’ welfare
rises, it is due to the fact that second period’s consumption rises as
the interest rate rt+1 changes: this increases welfare for individuals
born at t∗.
• Case 2:
Everyone’s welfare increases because when the biased innovation
occurs the economy has sufficient capital. In this economy the capital
level are between e
1
1−α and e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC . In this case, if an agents has a
lower impatience rate, his welfare will rise more.
• Case 3:
In this economy, there is relative abundance of capital, but the cap-
ital labor ratio is higher than e
1
α+1
(1−α)AC . In this case, individuals born
right before the innovation occurs lose welfare (because the change is
unexpected).
4 Conclusions
According to an two-period overlapping generations model with het-
erogeneous agents, a change of impatience rates does not create an
Biased Technological Change, Impatience and Welfare 15
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ambiguous effect of a biased technological change. However, the het-
erogeneity affects the magnitude of consumption changes.
When the economy is abundant in non reproducible factor, a bi-
ased innovation reduces everyone’s welfare, and the magnitude of the
change depends on the impatience rate. In an economy with such
characteristics the agents stay in a poverty trap. If a change in the
impatience rate at any period is considered, such that βi increases
enough to drive
∫ 1
0
(
βi
1+βi
)
di up and to increase capital to a level
K > e
1
1−α , agents born in the following periods are favored by tech-
nological change and can escape porverty.
Generations preceded by others with lower impatience rates will
be more favored by technological change. This fact has policy impli-
cations: biased technological change alone is unable to generate long
run economic growth if there is not enogugh capital and if impatience
rates are high. If technological change is endogenous, it is unlikely that
capital-using biased technological changes happen if there is unsuffi-
cient capital. However, if technological changes occur exogeneously,
its effects are not symmetric and might be perjudicial.
There are several ways to extend the analysis: using non loga-
rithmic utility function, so saving depends on the interest rate, or
analyzing differences in steady state levels of variables due to hetero-
genity. At last, an economy where technology is decided by votes by
heterogeneous agents can be considered.
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